Abstract: This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional Economics and presents a comprehensive framework for analyzing the risk management in agri-food sector. First, it specifies the diverse (natural, technical, behavioral, economic, policy etc.) type of agri-food risks, and the (market, private, public and hybrid) modes of their management. Second, it defines the efficiency of risk management and identifies (personal, institutional, dimensional, technological, natural) factors of governance choice. Next, it presents stages in analysis of risk management and for the improvement of public intervention in the risk governance. Finally, it identifies contemporary opportunities and challenges for risk governance in agri-food chain.
Introduction
Around the globe the issues of management of diverse (natural, market, criminal, policy etc.) risks in agrarian and food sectors are among the most topical in academic, business and policies debates (Babcock, 2004; CIPS, 2012; Deep and Dani, 2009; EU, 2011; OECD, 2008; Olsson and Skjöldebrand, 2008; RPDRM, 2012; Schaffnit-Chatterjee, 2010; Shepherd et al., 2006; Trench et al., 2011; Weaver and Kim, 2000) . In last decades, newly evolving uncertainty, risks and crisis associated with the progression of natural environment, products and technology safety, social demands, policies, economy, and globalization put additional challenges on existing system of risk management in agrifood sector.
Institute of Agricultural Economics, 125 Tzarigradsko shose, Blok 1, 1113 Sofia, Bulgaria, E-mail: hbachev@yahoo.com The risk is big when there is great likelihood of a risky event to occur and that is combined with substantial possible negative consequences. The later may take a great variety of forms -damaged human and livestock health and property, inferior yields and income, lost market positions, food and environmental contamination etc. When risk is considerable it would likely be associated with significant costs which sometimes are hardly expressed in monetary terms -e.g. human health hazards, degradared soils, lost biodiversity and eco-system services etc. Thus the "rational" agents maximizing own welfare will be interested to invest in risk prevention and reduction.
In a narrow (technical) sense the risk management comprises the individual, collective and public action(s) for reducing or eliminating risk and its negative consequences. In a broader sense the risk management is the specific system of social order (governance) responsible for a particular behavior(s) of agents and determining way(s) of assignment, protection, exchange, coordination, stimulation and disputing diverse risks, rights, resources, and activities (Bachev, 2011c) . In the particular socio-economic, technological and natural environment, the specific system of risk governance "put in place" is intimately responsible for the efficiency of detection, prevention, mitigation, and reduction of diverse threats and risks and their negative consequences.
Generic forms and mechanisms of risk governance are (Figure1): -market modes ("invisible hand of market") -various decentralized initiatives governed by free market price movements and market competition such as risk trading (selling and buying insurance), future contracts and options, production and trade of special (organic, fair-trade, origins) products etc.
-public modes ("public order") -various forms of a third-party public (Government, international) intervention in market and private sectors such as public information, regulation, ban, assistance, funding, assurance, taxation, provision etc.
Sometimes, risk management in agri-food sector could be effectively done though "self-management" -e.g. production management, adaptation to industry and formal standards, "self-insurance" though keeping stocks, financial reserves etc. For instance, primitive forms of on farm risk management through improving production management are widespread such as control and security enhancement, appropriate (pest, disease, weather resist) varieties, technology and production structure, product diversification, dislocation etc. Similarly, off-farm enterprise (income) diversification is a major strategy for risk management in most of the European farms (Bachev and Tanic, 2011) .
However, very often, risk management requires an effective governance of relations with other agents -exchange and regulations of rights, alignment of conflicts, coalition of resources, collective or public actions at regional, national and transnational scales. Accordingly, a risk could be "managed" through a market mode (e.g. purchase of insurance, hedging with future price contingency contracts), a private mode (contractual or literal integration, cooperation), a public form (state regulation, guarantee, compensation), or a hybrid combination of other forms.
Efficiency of risk management
Individual modes of risk governance are with unequal efficiency since they have dissimilar potential to reduce likelihood and impact of risk, and command different costs (Bachev, 2010) . Principally, the market or collective governance has bigger advantages over the internal mode ("own protection") since they allow the exploration of economies of scale and scope in risk prevention and bearing (sharing) negative consequences 2 . However, the risk trading and/or sharing is often associated with significant transaction costs for finding best partners, prices, formulating and disputing terms of exchange, coalition, safeguarding against new risk from opportunistic behavior of counterparts or partners etc. Consequently, market and private sector "fail" to govern effectively existing and likely risks in agri-food sector, and there is a need for a "state intervention" in risk management (assisting farmers cooperation, public costs-sharing or provision, mandatory insurance regulation etc.). Thus "governance matters" and applying a proper structure of risk management is an important part of the overall process of the optimization (effective allocation) of resources.
Following Coase's logic (1960) if property rights were well-defined and transaction costs were zero then all risks would be managed in the most efficient (socially optimal) way independent of the specific mode of governance 3 . Then individual agents would either sell out their risk to a specialized market agent, or safeguard against the risk through terms of a private contract, or join a risk-sharing organization of interested parties. The risk-taking would be distributed (exchanged, shared by) agents according to their will while the total costs for risk prevention, assurance, reduction, and recovery minimized. The rational choice for an individual agent would be to get rid of a significant risk altogether -to sell the risk out to a specialized market agent (a risk-taker). Such market governance would optimize the risk-taking and minimize the "technological costs" for risk assurance and recovery exploring the entire potential for economies of size and scope at national or transnational scales.
However, when property rights are not well-defined or enforced and transaction costs 4 are high then the type of governance is essential for the extent and costs of risk protection. For instance, an internal (ownership) mode is often preferred because of the comparative protective and costs advantages for "standard" natural or behavioral risk management over the outside (market or contract) modes. What is more, frequently the enormous transaction costs could even block the development of insurance market or the emergence of mutually beneficial (collective) risk-sharing organization. It is well known that despite "common" interests and the huge potential for risk minimization collective organization for risk-sharing are not or hardly developed by stallholders.
2 Most studies on risk management in agriculture focus on modeling farmers "willingness to pay" for a risk contract in relations to risk's probability and amount of likely damages (e.g. Gerasymenko and Zhemoyda, 2009) . 3 In such a world some kind of risks would not even exist or be of no importance -e.g. risks related to adverse human behavior. 4 Transaction costs are the costs associated with the distribution, protection and the exchange of diverse rights and obligations of individual, groups, and generations (Bachev, 2010) .
Furthermore, the formal and informal institutional restrictions could make some modes of risk governance impossible -e.g. risk assuring monopolies and/or cartel arrangements are illegal in many countries while most entrepreneurial risk-taking is endorsed (the "low risk -low profit" principle).
Thus, not all modes of risk governance are constantly feasible in any socio-economic settings 5 .
What is more, individual agents differ significantly in their capacity to recognize, take, pay for prevention, and manage a risk. For instance, a risk-taking farmer prefers risky but more productive forms -e.g. bank credit for a new profitable venture. Besides, individual agents have quite different interests for effective management of a particular risk(s) since they get unlike benefits and costs from risk management.
Last but not least important, there is no singe universal form for management of divers type of risks and according to the specific feature of each risk (origin, probability, likely damages) there will be different most effective form of governance. For instance, while low probable "standard" (natural, criminal) risk could be effectively governed by a classical market contract (purchase of insurance), most behavioral risks require special private modes (branding, long-term or interlink contracts, vertical integration), a high damaging risk from terrorist attract necessities specialized public forms (intelligence, security enforcement) etc.
Hence, depending on the kind and severity of risk, and the interests and personal characteristics of individuals, and the specific natural, economic and institutional environment, there will be different (most) efficient forms of governing a particular kind of risk. Consequently, some governance mix will always exist to deal with divers risks associated with the agri-food sector (Bachev and Nanseki, 2008 According to the specific natural and socio-economic environment, personal characteristics of individuals, and social preferences, various structure of risk governance could evolve in different subsectors, industries, supply chains, societies. In one extreme, the system of risk management would work well and only the "normal" (e.g. entrepreneurial) risk would be left "ungoverned". In some cases, market (free-market prices, competition) would fail to provide adequate risk governance but a variety of effective private modes would emerge to fill the gap -special contractual and organizational arrangements, vertical integration, cooperation. Often, both market and private governance may fail but an effective public involvement (regulation, assistance, support, partnerships) could cure the problem.
Nevertheless, there are situations when the specific institutional and risk management costs structure would lead to failures of market and private modes as well as of the needed public (Government, local authority etc.) intervention in risk governance 10 . Consequently, a whole range of risks would be left unmanaged which would have an adverse effect on size and sustainability of agri-food enterprises, markets development, evolution of production and consumption, state of environment, and social welfare (Bachev, 2010) . Depending on the costs and efficiency of the specific system of governance in a particular (sub)sector, region, country, supply chain etc. there will be unlike outcome in terms of "residual" risks, and dissimilar state and costs of human, food, environmental etc. security in different regions and period of time ( Figure 1 ). For instance, when there is inefficient public enforcement of food, labor, environmental etc. safety standards (lack of political willingness or administrative capability) then enormous "gray" agrarian and food sector develops with inferior, hazardous and counterfeit components.
Factors of governance choice
The forms of risk management in agri-food sector would depended on risk type, personal characteristics, institutional environment, progress in science and technologies, culture, social education and preferences, evolution of natural environment etc. (Figure 1 ).
Risk features like origin, probability of occurrence, likely damages, scale etc. are important factor for the governance choice. For instance, local risk could be managed though a private mode while most of market and environmental risks require collective actions at regional, national or transnational level.
For high probability and harmful risks the agents will prefer more secure (more expensive) modesecurity investment, purchase of insurance, keeping reserves, taking hostages, interlinked organization.
Nevertheless due to lack of economic means many small farmers can not afford related costs and practice no or primitive forms of risk management -cash and carry deals, product diversification etc.
Here there is a need for a third party (Government, international assistance) intervention though insurance, support, safety net etc. schemes to decrease farmers vulnerability.
Personal and behavioral characteristics of agents (interests, preferences, knowledge, capability, riskaversion, reputation, trust, "contractual" power, opportunisms) are important factor for the choice of management form. For instance, some risks are not perceived (unknown) by private and public agents and therefore no risk management is put at all; in some cultures, the cooperative is the preferred mode of agrarian organization; experienced and trained farmer could design and manage bigger organization (hired labor) and more outside (credit, insurance, inputs supply etc.) contracts adapted to his specific needs; a risk-taking entrepreneur prefers riskier but more productive ventures etc.
Behavioral factors such as individuals bounded rationality and opportunisms have been identified as responsible for the transaction costs and thus for the choice of organizational mode (Williamson, 1996) . Agents do not possess full information about the economic system (risks, price ranges and dynamics, trade opportunities, policy development) since collection and processing of such information is very expensive or impossible (multiple markets, future events, partners intention for cheating). In order to optimize decision-making they have to spent on "increasing their imperfect rationality" (data collection, analysis, forecasting, training, consultation) and selecting forms minimizing related risks/costs (internal organization, "selling out" risk etc.).
Agents are also given to opportunism and if there is an opportunity for some of transacting sides to get non-punishably extra benefit/rent from exchange he will likely to take an advantage of that 11 . Precontractual opportunism ("adverse selection") occurs when some of the partners use the "information asymmetry" to negotiate better contract terms. Post-contractual opportunism ("moral hazard") occurs when some counterpart takes advantage of impossibility for full observation on his activities (by another partner, a third-party) or when he takes "legal advantages" of unpredicted changes in exchange conditions (costs, prices, formal regulations). The third form ("free ride") occurs in development of large organizations where individual benefits are not-proportional to individual efforts (costs) and everyone tend to expect others to invest in organizational development and benefit from the new organization in case of a success (Olson, 1969) .
It is often costly or impossible to distinguish opportunistic from non-opportunistic behavior because of the bounded rationality (e.g. a farmer finds out that purchased seeds are not of high quality only during the harvesting time) and agents have to protect their rights, investments, and transactions from hazard of opportunism through: ex-ante efforts to find reliable counterpart and design efficient mode for partners credible commitments; and ex-post investments for overcoming (through monitoring, controlling, stimulating cooperation) of possible opportunism during contract execution stage (Williamson, 1996) .
In agri-food sector opportunism is widespread before signing insurance contract (not disclosing the real information for possible risks) or during the contract execution period (not taking actions for reducing damages when event occurs; consciously provoking damages in order to get insurance premium etc.). That augments considerably the insurance prices and restricts utilization of insurance contracts by small enterprises. On the other hand, insuree often "discover" the pre-contractual opportunism of insurers only after the occurrence of harmful event finding out that not all assurance terms (protected risks, extend of coverage of damages, ways of assessing damages, hidden costs) had been well explained and/or adapted to farmers needs.
For many kind of farm related risks markets evolve very slowly and/or insurance services are practically inaccessible by majority of small operators. What is more, for many important risks 11 If there is no opportunism only risk related to bounded rationality would remain (natural, technical) and consequences easily recovered with cooperation and mutual benefit (risk sharing) of all parties.
insurance is not available "for purchase at all" -e.g. risk of lack of market demand for farm products, fluctuation of prices, possible opportunism of counterparts etc. That is why farmers have to develop other (private, collective) modes to safeguard their investments and rights or lobby for a public intervention in assurance supply.
The institutional environment ("rules of the game") 12 is important factor for the management choice.
For instance, in many countries some forms of risk governance are fundamental rights (on food, labor, environmental security and safety) and guaranteed by the state; public income support to farmers is "institutionalized"; environment and food safety standards could differ even between different regions in the same state etc. Furthermore, the (external) institutional environment considerably affects the level of transaction costs -e.g. in recent years tens of thousands of European farms and processors have been closed due to impossibility to adapt to (invest for) newly introduced EU standards for quality, safety, environmental preservation, animal welfare, certification etc.
Principally, in conditions of stable and well-working public regulation (regulations, quality standards, price guarantees, quotas) and effective mechanisms for laws and contract enforcement, a preference is given to standard (spotlight and classical) market contracts. When rights and rules are not well defined or changing, and absolute/contracted right effectively enforced, that lead to domination of primitive form of risk management (subsistence farming, personalized and over-integrated forms) and high vulnerability to diverse (natural, private, market, contractual, policy) risks. The later was the case during post communist transition in East Europe characterized by fundamental restructuring, "rules change" and ineffective public enforcement, high exposure to "new" (natural, market, entrepreneurial, private, contractual, institutional, international) risks by the evolving private structures, unsustainable organizations, large gray economies, undeveloped or missing (agrarian credit, insurance, extension supply) markets, individuals (e.g. thefts) and organized (providers of "security service") risk introduction devastating private businesses and household welfare (Bachev, 2010) .
Dimensional characteristics of activity and transactions (combination of uncertainty, frequency, assets specificity, and appropriability) 13 are critical for the management choice. When recurrence of transactions between the same partners is high, then both sides are interested in sustaining and minimizing costs of their relations (avoiding opportunism, sharing risk, building reputation, setting up incentive, adjustment, and conflict resolution mechanisms). Here continuation of the relations with a particular partner/s and designing a special mode for transacting has a high economic value and costs for its development could be effectively recovered by frequent exchange. When a transaction is occasional (incidental) then possibility for opportunism is great since cheating side can not be easily punished by turning to a competitor (losing future business).
When uncertainty surrounding transactions increases, then costs for carrying out and secure transactions go up (for overcoming information deficiency, safeguarding against risk). Since bounded rationality is crucial and opportunism can emerge the agents will use special private form diminishing transaction uncertainty -trade with origins; providing guarantee; using share-rent or output-based compensation; obligatory collateral for providing a credit; participating in inputs-supply or marketing cooperative; complete integration.
Transaction costs get very high when specific assets for relations with a particular partner are to be deployed. Here costless alternative use of specific assets (loss of value) is not possible if transactions fail to occur, are prematurely terminated, or less favorable terms are renegotiated (in contract renewal time before the end of life-span of specific capital). Therefore, dependant investment/assets have to be safeguarded by special form such as long-term or tied-up contract, interlinks, hostage taking, joint investment, quasi or complete integration. Often, later is quite expensive, investment in specific capital not made, and activity/transactions can not take place or occurs without (or loss of) comparative advantages in respect to productivity.
If a high symmetrical (risk, capacity, product, timing, location) dependency of assets of counterparts exists (regime of "bilateral trade") there are strong incentives in both parties to elaborate special private mode of governance (e.g. interlinking credit, inputs and insurance supply against marketing of output). A special relational contract is applied when detailed terms of transacting are not known at outset (high uncertainty), and framework (mutual expectations) rather than specification of obligations is practiced. Here partners (self)restrict from opportunism and are motivated to settle emerging difficulties and continue relations (situation of frequent reciprocial trade).
When unilateral dependency exists (unwanted "exchange", quasi or full monopoly), then dependent side has to protect investments against possible opportunism (behavioral uncertainty/certainty) through integrating transactions (unified organization, joint ownership, cooperative); or safeguarding them with interlinked contract, exchange of economic hostages, development of collective organization to outstand asymmetrical dependency (for price negotiation, lobbying for Government regulations etc.).
Activity and transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of rights on behavior, products, services or resources is low. Because of the bounded rationality, the costs for protection, detection, verification, and a third-party (court) punishment of unwanted exchange extremely high. Agents would either over-produce (e.g. negative externalities) or under-organize such activity (positive externalities) unless they are governed by efficient private or hybrid mode -cooperation, strategic alliances, long-term contract, trade secrets, or public order.
The progress in science and technologies significantly improves risk management and facilitate diversification of its form. For instance, introduction of new (resistant) plant and livestock varieties; mechanization and standardization of operations and products; application of information, forecasting, monitoring, storage, and transportation technologies, all they improve significantly risk management in agri-food chain (COST Foresignt 2030; Hefnawy, 2011) . Modern application of science and technologies is also application with production and/exposure to new type of risks -green-house gas emitions, genetic contamination, natural resource depletion, technical over-dependency etc.
Finally, the evolution of natural environment -global worming, extreme weather, plant and animal diseases, drought, flooding and other natural disasters are posing series of new challenges for risk management in agrarian and food sector (Hefnawy, 2011; OECD, 2011) .
Identification of the "critical factors" of risk management choice, the range of practically possible forms, and their efficiency (costs and benefits) for individual agents, stage, subsectors, countries, food chains and public is to be a subject for a special micro-economic study.
The comparative analysis is to be employed to select among feasible forms the most efficient one reducing the overall risk to "acceptable" level and minimizing the total (risk assurance and governance) costs. Most of the elements of the efficiency of risk governance are hardly to quantifye.g. the individuals' characteristics, the amount of risk, the level of benefits and costs 14 associated with each mode etc. That is why a qualitative (Discrete structural) analysis 15 could be used. The later matches the features of a risk to be managed (probability, significance, acceptance level, needs for collective action) and its critical (institutional, technological, behavioral etc.) factors with the comparative advantages (effective potential) of alternative modes to inform, stimulate appropriate behavior, and align interests of associated agents, and to overcome, reduce, control, share, dispute, and minimize the overall costs of that risk.
In a specific market, institutional, technological and natural environment the effective risk governance choice will depend on combination of risk features (probability of occurrence, likely magnitude of damages) and the critical dimensions of activity/transactions (appropriability, assets specificity and frequency). Figure 3 presents a matrix with the principle forms for effective risk governance in agrifood sector. For instance, high "standard" risk could be effectively managed through a free market mode such as a standard (classical) insurance, inputs supply, marketing etc. contracts. However, serious transacting risk exists when condition of assets specificity is combined with high uncertainty, low frequency, and good appropriability. Elaboration of a special governing structure for private transacting is not justified, specific (risk reducing) investments not made, and activity/restriction of activity fails to occur at effective scale ("market and contract failure"). Here, a third-part (private, NGO, public) involvement in transactions is necessary (assistance, arbitration, regulation) in order to make them more efficient or possible at all. The unprecedented development of special origins, organic farming, systems of "fair-trade" are good examples in this respect. There is increasing consumer's demand (price premium) for organic, original, and fair-trade products associated with some forms of (natural, poor household, labor, quality etc.) risk management. Nevertheless their supply could not be met unless effective trilateral governance including independent certification and control is put in place. 
Appropriability

Stages in analysis and improvement of risk management
The analysis and improvement of risk governance in agri-food chain is to include following steps Second, specification of existing and other feasible modes of risks governance, and assessing their efficiency, sustainability and prospects of development. Efficiency of individual modes shows capability for risks detection, prevention, mitigation and recovery at lowest costs while sustainability reveals "internal" potential to adapt to socio-economic, technological and environmental changes and associated threats and risks. A holistic framework for assessing the efficiency and the evolution of governing modes is suggested by OECD (2011) and Bachev (2010) . That stage is to identify deficiencies of dominating (market, private, and public) modes to solve existing and emerging risks, and to determine the needs for (new) public intervention. For instance, when appropriability associated with transaction/activity is low, there is no pure market or private mode to protect from associated
Identification of diverse threats and risks in agrifood sector
Assessing efficiency of existing and other feasible modes of risk managements, and indentifying needs for public intervention
Assessing comparative efficiency of alternative modes for public intervention, and selecting the best one(s) risks 16 . Emerging of a special large-members organization for dealing with low appropriability to cover the entire "social" risk would be very slow and expensive, and they unlikely be sustainable in a long run (free riding). Therefore, there is a strong need for third-party public intervention in order to make protection of such risk possible or more effective -either pure public organization (e.g. public assurance for high damage natural or economic disasters) or "quasi public" mode (collective organization assisted/ordered by a third party) for high probable lower damaging risks (Figure 2 ).
Third, identification of alternative modes for public intervention to correct (market, private, public)
failures, assessing their comparative efficiency, and selection the best one(s). Comparative assessment is to be made on (technically, economically, politically) feasible forms as mode(s) minimizing the total risk management (implementing and transaction) costs selected. The analysis is to take into account the overall private and social costs -the direct and indirect (individual, third-party, tax payer, assistance agency etc.) expenses, and private and public transacting costs. The later often comprise a significant portion of the overall risk management costs and are usually ignored -e.g. costs for coordination, stimulation, mismanagement of bureaucracy; for individuals' participation and usage of public modes (expenses for information, paper works, payments of fees, bribes); costs for community control over and for reorganization of bureaucracy (modernization and liquidation of public modes), and (opportunity) costs of public inaction, etc.
Initially, existing and emerging problems (difficulties, costs, risks, failures) in organization of market and private governance have to be specified. The appropriate pubic involvement would be to create institutional environment for: making private investments less dependent, decreasing uncertainty surrounding market and private transactions, increasing intensity of exchange, protecting private rights and investments. For instance, State establishes and enforces quality, safety and eco-standards, certifies producers, regulates employment relations, transfers management rights on natural resources etc., and all that increases the efficiency of market and private risk management.
Next, practically possible modes for increasing appropriability have to be considered. The low appropriability is often caused by unspecified or badly specified private rights and obligations. In some cases, most effective government intervention would be to introduce and enforce new private and groups (property) rights -on diverse type of risks and its trading; on natural and biological 16 Respecting others rights or "granting" risk protection rights to others could be governed by "good will" or charity actions (e.g. eco-sustainability movement initially evolved as a voluntary activity). In any case, voluntary initiatives could hardly satisfy the entire social demand especially if they require significant costs.
resources; on food safety and clean environment; tradable quotas for products, inputs, emissions; on intellectual property, origins etc. That intervention transfers organization of transactions into market and private governance, liberalizes market competition and induces private incentives (and investments) in certain agrarian risk management.
In other instances, it is more efficient to put in place public regulations for risk minimization: for utilization of resources, products and services (standards for labor, product, environmental safety);
introduction of foreign species and GM crops, and (water, soil, air, comfort) contamination; ban on certain inputs, products or technologies; regulations for trading ecosystem service protection; trade regimes; mandatory risk and eco-training and licensing of operators.
In other instances, using incentives and restrictions of tax system is the most effective form for intervention. Different sorts of tax preferences are widely used to create favorable conditions for development of certain (sub)sectors and regions, forms of organization, segment of population, or types of activities. For instance, environmental taxation on emissions or products (inputs, outputs of production) is applied to reduce use or emissions of harmful substances; tax reduction us use to overcome negative consequences of natural disasters etc.
In some cases, public support to private organizations is the best mode for intervention. Programs for modernization, enterprise adaptation, income support, environmental conservation, public risk-sharing etc. are common in all countries.
Often providing public information, recommendations, and training to farmers, entrepreneurs, residence, and consumers in risk management is the most efficient form.
In some cases, pure public organization (in-house production, public provision) is the most effective as in case of critical infrastructure; food safety inspections; research, education and extension; agrometeorological forecasts; border sanitary and veterinary control; recovery from natural catastrophe etc.
Usually, specific modes are effective if they are applied alone with other modes of public intervention.
The necessity of combined intervention (governance mix) is caused by: complementarities (joint effect) of individual forms; restricted potential of some less expensive forms to achieve certain (but not entire) level of socially preferred risk prevention and mitigation; possibility to get extra benefits (e.g. "cross-compliance" requirement for participation in public programs); specific critical dimensions of governed activity; risk and uncertainty (little knowledge, experience) associated with likely impact of new forms; administrative and financial capability of Government to fund, control, and implement different modes; and dominating policy doctrine.
The level of effective public intervention (governance) also depends on the kind of risk and the scale of intervention. There are public involvements which are to be executed at local (ecosystem, community, regional) level, while others require nationwide governance. And finally, there are risk management activities, which are to be initiated and coordinated at international (regional, European, worldwide) level due to strong necessity for trans-border actions or consistent (national, local) government failures. Very frequently effective governance of many problems and risks requires multilevel governance with system of combined actions at various levels involving diverse range of actors and geographical scales.
The public (regulatory, provision, inspecting) modes must have built mechanisms for increasing competency (decrease bounded rationality, powerlessness) of bureaucrats, beneficiaries, interests groups and public as well as restricting possible opportunism (cheating, interlinking, abuse of power)
of public officers and stakeholders. That could be made by training, introducing new assessment and communication technologies, increasing transparency, and involving experts, beneficiaries, and interests groups in management of public modes at all levels.
Generally, hybrid modes (public-private partnership) are much more efficient than pure public forms given coordination, incentives, control and cost-sharing advantages. Involvement of farmers, beneficiaries and interest groups increases efficiency, decreases asymmetry of information, restricts opportunisms, increases incentives for private co-investment, reduces management costs. For instance, enforcement of most labor, animal welfare, environmental standards is often very difficult or impossible. Stimulating and supporting (assisting, training, funding) private voluntary actions are much more effective then mandatory public modes in terms of incentive, coordination, enforcement, and disputing costs (Bachev, 2010) .
If there is strong need for third-party public involvement but effective (government, local authority, international assistance) intervention in risk management is not introduced in a due time, then significant risks to individuals and public at large would persist while agrarian "development" is substantially deformed.
Dealing with many problems and risks in agri-food sector/chain would require multiform, hybrid, multilevel, and transnational intervention, and therefore the appropriate governance mix is to be specified as a result of the comparative analysis. The later let improve design of (new) public intervention according to the specific conditions of food-chain components in particular country or region in terms of increasing security and decreasing costs. Suggested new approach also let predict likely cases of (new) public failures due to impossibility to mobilize political support and resources or ineffective implementation of otherwise "good" policies in particular conditions. Since public failure is feasible, its timely detection permits foreseeing persistence/rising of certain risks, and informing local and international communities about consequences.
The risk management analysis is to be made at different levels -individual component (inputs supply, farm, processing, transportation, distribution), regional, sub-sectors, food-chain, national, and international according to the type of risks and scales of collective actions necessary to mitigate the risks. It is not a one time exercise completing in the last stage with a perfect system of riskmanagement. It is rather a permanent process which is to improve risk-management along with the evolution of socio-economic and natural environment, individual and communities' awareness, and modernization of technologies. Besides, public (local, national, international) failure often prevails which brings us into the next cycle in improvement of risk-management in agri-food sector.
For application of the suggested new approach besides traditional statistical, industry etc. data a new type of data are necessary for diverse type of risks and forms of governance, their critical factors for each agent, level of related benefits and costs etc. Such data are be collected though interviews with agri-food chain managers, stakeholders, and experts in the area.
Contemporary opportunities and challenges for risk governance in agri-food chain
Modern agri-food chains involve millions actors with different interests, multiple stages, and divers risks requiring complex, multilateral and multilevel governance at a large scale. For instance, number of farmers in EU is several millions, different food-processors and retailers are several hundred thousands, while final consumers reaches 500 millions 17 .
Various existing and emerging (natural, technological, behavioral) threats and risks along with modern agri-food chains are well-identified (DTRA & IIBR, 2011; Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006; OECD, 2011) .
Diverse market and private modes have emerged to deal with specific risks driven by ethics, competition, consumer demand, business initiatives, and trade opportunities -e.g. direct marketing, voluntary codes (professional and corporate social, labor, environmental etc. responsibility), industry standards, insurance schemes, guarantees, fair-trade, trade with brands, origins, organic and quality products (Figure 4 ).
Furthermore, different bilateral and multilateral private forms are widely used to safeguard against risks, explore benefits, and facilitate exchange -e.g. clientalisation, contractual arrangements, cooperation, complete backward or forward integration.
Special trilateral forms have evolved to enhance security and partners and consumers confidence including independent (a third-party) certification and inspection. Trade internationalization is increasingly associated with collective private actions (standards, control mechanisms etc.) at a transnational and global scale (e.g. GLOBALGAP).
Property (security and safety) rights modernization, and market and private "failures" brought about needs and modes for public interventions (assistance, regulations, provision) in agri-food sector.
Moreover, the scope and stringency of publicly-imposed rules expend constantly embracing new products, methods, dimensions (human, animal, plant, eco-health), hazards (GMC, nanotechnology, terrorism), and information requirements. There are a number of (new) opportunities for risk governance in agri-food chain ( Figure 6 ):
First, advances and dissemination of technical food-chain, training and risk-management methods (microbiological, genetic, electrical, laser, robotic, immunological, chemical and biosensors, nanotechnology, ICT) , integral and food-chain approaches, and research, monitoring, testing, decision, and foresighting capability for risk-detection, assessment, prevention, and mitigation (COST, 2009; Trench at al., 2011) . For instance, advancements in detection, assessment and mitigation methods and technologies associated with biological and chemical risks have been presented at a recent international conference (DTRA & IIBR, 2011) .
Second, modernization and international harmonization of institutional environment (private, corporate, collective, NGOs, public food-safety and related standards, rules, enforcements etc.). For instance, EU membership improves considerably the "rules of the game" in new member states; market access rules, and/or "corporate responsibilities" induce agri-food sector transformation of exporting countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia etc.
Third, considerable development of specialization of activities (including in risk-taking, monitoring, management) and concentration of (integral) management in food-production, processing, servicing, and distribution -centralized innovation and enforcement; time, scale, and scope economies; easy third-party control etc. For instance, market share of three largest food-retailers comprise between 27-91% in EU states (Eurostat); food-safety training, certification, inspection, and information are big international business (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006) etc. For example, in Bulgaria (raw) milk supply is closely integrated by (dairy) processors through on-farm (collecting, testing) investments and interlink (inputs, credit, and service supply against milk-delivery) contracts with stallholders, while dairy marketing is managed by branding and long-term contractsstandards and bio-labels (Bachev, 2011a) .
Fifth, increasing consumers "willingness to pay" for food-safety attributes such as chemical and hormone bans, safety and inspection labels, original and special products etc. (Trench at al., 2011) .
The later justify and make economically possible paying-back of costs for a special governance. ii/ Increasing new threats, risks and uncertainty connected with the inputs, technologies, and products differentiation and innovation -e.g. Fukushima nuclear accident severely affected agri-food sector;
there are uncertainties associated with growing application of nanotechnologies and GMCs etc.
(Eurostat).
iii/ Increasing specialization and concentration of activity and organizations which separates "riskcreation" (incident, ignorance, opportunistic behavior) and risk-taking (unilateral-dependencies, quasi-monopolies, spill-overs, externalities). That makes risk-assessment, pricing, communication, disputing, and liability through (pure) market and private modes very difficult and costly. For instance, cheating, misleading, and pirating are common in food-chain relations -high information asymmetry, detection, disputing, and punishment costs (Bachev, 2010) . It is indicating that for food risk information consumers in EU trust more to "health professionals", "family and friends", "consumers associations", "scientists" rather than "food producers" and "supermarkets and shops" (Figure 7 ). iv/ Widespread mass production, distribution, and consumption increases vulnerability of agri-food chain expending scope and severity of natural, incidental, opportunistic, criminal or terrorist risks. For instance, in Europe there is a progressive number of official notifications based on market and non-member countries controls, food-poisoning, consumer complaints, company own-checks, border screening and rejections (Eurostat).
v/ Increasing adaptation and compliance costs (capital, training, certification, documentation etc.) for rapidly evolving market and institutional environment which delay or prevent reformation of smaller farms and food-chain enterprises (Trench et al., 2011; Bachev, 2010) . For instance, in Bulgaria dairy and meat processors adaptation to EU standards have continued 10 years while two-thirds of them ceased to exist before the country accession to the EU (Bachev, 2011a) .
vi/ Public and private food quality and safety standards and efficiency of their enforcement differ considerably between industries, countries, and regions (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006) . That is result of unequal norms (e.g. GAPs, formal and informal rules) and implementing and enforcing capability, and/or deliberate policies or private strategies (e.g. multinationals sell the "same" products with unlike quality in different countries). The "double/multiple standards" is responsible for the inequality of exchange, and dissimilar threats and risks exposure of individual agri-food systems.
vii/ Wide spreading "public failures" in food-chain (risk) management -bad, inefficient, delayed, under or over interventions; gaps, overlaps, infighting and contradictions of different agencies and rules; high bureaucratic costs; unsustainable and underfunding etc. For instance, the Bulgarian Food Agency has been established with a 5 years delay; the Acquis Communautaire are still not completely implemented in the country (capability deficiency, mismanagement, corruption); trust to the EU rather than the national institutions prevails (Bachev, 2010) . There are numerous instances of international assistance or governance failures when institutions are "imported" rather than adapted or designed for the specific local conditions (Bachev, 2010) .
viii/ Production, marketing, and consumption traditions, the high food or governance costs, the will and capacity deficiency, all they are responsible for persistence of a large risky informal/gray agrifood sector around the globe without effective control, and substandard, fake, and illegitimate products and activities. For instance, merely one-third of the Bulgarian dairy farms comply with the EU milkstandards, only 0.1% possess safe manure-pile sites, a half of produced milk is home-consumed, exchanged or directly sold (Bachev, 2010) .
ix/ Multiplying new treats and risks associated with the adversary (e.g. by a competitor) and terrorist attacks, and the emerging governing and exchange forms (e.g. street-sells; internet, phone and mailorders; shopping-trips). All they require specific/non-traditional risk-management methods and modes -guards; policing; intelligence; multi-organizational and transnational cooperation etc.
Conclusion
The analysis of modes, efficiency and challenges of risk management in agri-food chain let us withdraw a number of academic, business and policies recommendations:
First, the governance (along with technical, information etc.) issues are to take a central part in the risk management analysis and design. The type of threats and risks, and the specific (natural, technological, behavioral, dimensional, institutional etc.) factors, and comparative benefits and costs (including third-party, transaction, time) are to be taken into account in assessing efficiencies, complementarities and prospects of alternative (market, private, public and hybrid) modes. The system of risk management is to adapt/improved taking advantage of the specified new opportunities and overcoming/defending against new challenges.
Second, more hybrid (public-private, public-collective) modes should be employed given coordination, incentives, control, and costs advantages. The (pure) public management of most agri-food-chain risks is difficult or impossible (agents opportunism, informal sector, externalities). Often introduction and enforcement of new rights (on food security, risk-management responsibility etc.), and supporting private and collective initiatives (informing, training, assisting, funding) is much more efficient.
Third, a greater support must be given to multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research on (factors, modes, impacts of) risk governance in agri-food chain in order to assist effectively the national and international policies, the design of modes for public interventions, and the individual, collective and business actions for risk management.
